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Abstract 
 
In a synthesis of recent advances, this article gives a fresh, balanced theory of inter-
organizational relations. It integrates competence and governance perspectives. It considers 
the choice between mergers/acquisitions and alliances. It offers a toolbox of instruments to 
govern relational risk, and the contingencies for their selection. Relationships can last too 
long. Therefore, the article also looks at how to end relationships. Beyond dyads of 
collaborating firms, it includes effects of network structure and position.  
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Introduction 
 
The sourcing decision -what to make or buy- is a special case of the more general 
decision what to do inside one’s own organisation, and what to do outside, in collaboration 
with other organisations. Sourcing entails vertical collaboration, in the supply chain. Other 
forms of collaboration may be horizontal, with competitors, or lateral, with firms in other 
industries. Next to the question what to do inside or outside, and why, there are the questions 
with whom to collaborate, and how: in what forms of organisation and with what instruments 
for governance.  
The time is ripe for a unified theory, which analyses all these questions, balancing 
different perspectives and arguments that have emerged in recent advances from different 
disciplines. In particular, there is a need to combine perspectives of competence and 
governance (Williamson  1999). From the competence perspective, there has been a focus on 
the development of competencies and learning, with a neglect of relational risk and its 
governance. TCE has focused on ‘hold-up risk’ and the hazards of opportunism, to the neglect 
of learning and the potential of trust.  
This article avoids claims of universal best practice. In the literature, important new 
insights have been generated, but they tend to focus on few aspects, resulting in one-sided 
conclusions. Opinion seems to have settled on a rather extreme view in favour of outsourcing 
everything that is not part of ‘core competencies’. This is problematic (Bettis, Bradley & 
Hamel 1992). 
This article looks not only at the positive but also at the negative side of relationships, 
and at how relationships may be ended. An attempt is made to find a balance between 
unconstrained flexibility, inspired by US experience, and more stable relations in European 
traditions. 
Outside sociology there still is a tendency to look at relations in terms of dyads. 
This article also looks at network effects of multiple partners and indirect linkages, studied in 
sociology  (see e.g. Powell 1990, Burt 1992, Uzzi 1996).  
The article proceeds as follows. First comes an integrated summary of theoretical 
perspectives. Then there is a summary of goals of collaboration, forms of organisation and the 
choice between them, instruments for governance of relational risk, contingencies for their 
choice, network effects, and relationship development.  
 
PERSPECTIVES 
Learning 
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the transaction cost explanation of 
organisation. First, by its own admission (Williamson 1985: 144-145, 1999), it has little to say 
about learning and innovation. Second, contrary to what Williamson (1993) claimed, trust and 
loyalty matter. Other theoretical sources are needed to incorporate learning and trust. I claim 
that for this different elements of theory can be integrated into a coherent whole.  
 The first extension draws from the competence view. While transaction cost 
economics focuses on static efficiency – by trading off production costs, transaction costs and 
costs of organisation, given a certain state of knowledge, technology and preferences– we 
require a perspective of dynamic efficiency or innovation, incorporating shifts of knowledge, 
technology and preferences. It is now a priority for firms to develop ‘dynamic capabilities’. 
For this, they need to maintain flexibility of configurations of competencies, for the sake of 
innovation in the form of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’. This yields the claim that 
firms should concentrate on the activities at which they are best and outsource the other 
activities as much as strategically possible. For example, in order to reduce development 
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times of new products and to reduce risks of maladjustment to customer needs, the supplier 
should be brought in as a partner in developing and launching a new product. However, note 
the qualification of strategic possibilities. One may need to integrate activities in order to 
control risks of dependence and spillover, or to preserve options for future core competencies. 
 In addition to the usual considerations of efficiency, flexibility, and speed, learning is 
an important goal of collaboration. This is supported by a theory of knowledge that suggests 
that people's perceptions and interpretations are dependent on mental frameworks (Johnson-
Laird 1983), which develop from the experience they have. Those frameworks constitute 
‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In organisations, a focus is needed of shared 
perceptions, interpretations, and values, in order to achieve common goals. This yields the 
idea of an organisation as a ‘sensemaking system’ (Weick, 1979, 1995), ‘system of shared 
meaning’ (Smircich, 1983), ‘focusing device’ (Nooteboom, 1992, 1999), or ‘interpretation 
system’ (Choo, 1998). This is more fundamental for organisations than the need to reduce 
transaction costs. However, such organisational focus creates a risk of myopia, which needs to 
be redressed by employing complementary cognition from outside partners, at a ‘cognitive 
distance’ that is sufficiently large to yield novel insight and sufficiently small to ensure that it 
is still comprehensible (Nooteboom, 1992, 2000). 
 This yields a prediction that is opposite to a prediction from TCE. According to the 
latter, firms integrate more when uncertainty increases, since inside the control of ‘hold-up’ 
risk is more feasible than in outside contracting. I argue that when uncertainty increases, in 
the sense that technologies and markets become more complex and change becomes faster, 
firms have a greater need for outside complementary competence, for the sake of flexibility 
and learning. As a result, under higher uncertainty firms should use outside suppliers more 
rather than less.   
  
Transactions and relations 
Competencies are not off-the-shelf products but are embedded in the heads and hands 
of people, in teams, organisational structure and procedures, and organisational culture. They 
have a strong tacit dimension, especially in innovation. Their development is path-dependent: 
they build upon preceding firm-specific assets and organisational learning (cf. Lippman & 
Rumelt 1982). Ongoing or intermittent interaction is needed to enable the exchange of tacit 
knowledge. Some scholars conclude that this requires full organisational integration, but I 
deny that. However, the exchange and joint production of knowledge between firms with 
different perspectives and competencies does require mutual absorptive capacity and a shared 
language for communication, to cross ‘cognitive distance’. This takes time to develop, and 
can require a dedicated investment, so that relations have to last a sufficiently long time to 
make the investment worthwhile. Here, in this new perspective on specific investments, 
needed to achieve mutual understanding, there is a connection between the competence 
perspective and transaction cost thinking.  
Mutual understanding and trust emerge in a process of interaction. As a result, we 
need to consider not transactions by themselves, but transactions in the setting of an exchange 
relationship that develops in time (Granovetter, 1985; Helper, 1987; Ring & Van de Ven, 
1992; Sako, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996).  
According to TCE, it is impossible to reliably judge possible limits to other people’s 
opportunism, and therefore trust does not yield a reliable safeguard (Williamson, 1975: 31-
37). If trust goes beyond calculative self-interest, it yields blind, unconditional trust, which is 
not wise and will not survive in markets (Williamson, 1993).  From a social science 
perspective, many others take the view that trust is viable, without necessarily becoming blind 
or unconditional (Macauley, 1963; Deutsch, 1973; Granovetter, 1973; Ouchi, 1980; 
Gambetta, 1988; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Helper, 1990; Hill, 1990; Bromiley & Cummings, 
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1992; Murakami & Rohlen, 1992; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Gulati, 
1995; McAllister, 1995; Chiles & MacMackin, 1996; Noorderhaven, 1996; Nooteboom, 
1996; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). Man is not only self-interested and 
opportunistic, and in business also common honesty and decency are found. Partners may 
develop mutual empathy. They may voluntarily refrain from opportunism. Trust, then, enables 
a leap beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989), and thus beyond formal control mechanisms. A committed partner does not 
immediately exit from the relationship in case of unforeseen problems, but engages in ‘voice’ 
(Hirschman, 1979; Helper, 1987). Voice and commitment need not and should not entail that 
relations last endlessly. Indeed, relations can become too durable, and too exclusive, with too 
much mutual identification and trust, yielding rigidities and lack of the variety that is needed 
for learning. Social capital can deteriorate into social liability (Leenders & Gabbay, 1999; 
Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999).  
In spite of fundamental criticism of TCE, it still yields useful insights for governance. 
It has been used empirically with sometimes considerable and sometimes limited success. Its 
core insight is that dedicated investments yield switching costs, which create dependence, 
resulting in a risk of 'hold-up'. Given hazards of opportunism, this risk must be ‘governed’. 
That insight has been widely corroborated in empirical studies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; 
Hennart, 1988; Parkhe, 1993; Berger, Noorderhaven & Nooteboom, 1995; Chiles & 
MacMackin, 1996; Nooteboom, Noorderhaven & Berger, 1997). TCE next claims that when 
the risk is high, it requires organisational integration to control it (Williamson, 1975). Full 
integration entails MA, but there are intermediate forms of semi-integration by means of 
detailed ‘bilateral governance’ (Williamson, 1985). When the frequency of transactions does 
not warrant the investment in detailed bilateral governance, one can employ a third party for 
arbitration, in ‘trilateral’ governance. Here, in the prediction of organisational forms of 
collaboration, the empirical results of TCE are mixed and inconclusive . I propose that this is 
due to lack of attention to dynamic capabilities. As suggested above, uncertainty may lead to 
more, not less outside partnerships, and looser, not tighter control.   
 
Propositions 
The analysis yields the following propositions: 
H1: Counter to TCE, learning and trust are essential features of inter-firm relationships. 
H2: Counter to TCE, the relationship rather the transaction should be the unit of analysis. 
H3: Counter to TCE, for the existence of the firm the creation of a cognitive focus is more 
fundamental than the reduction of transaction costs (which can be achieved also in 
collaboration between firms). 
H4: Obtaining complementary cognitive scope is an additional argument for outsourcing.  
H5: Counter to TCE, under greater uncertainty complexity and change, firms (should) 
outsource more, not less, with looser, not tighter control. 
H6: TCE still yields useful features concerning relational risk and instruments for 
governance.  
H7: Relationships can deteriorate into rigidities, and ending a relationship may be as 
important as starting one.   
 
GOALS AND RELATIONAL RISK 
Goals 
There are a variety of goals of collaboration. Table 1 gives a summary. The goals are 
grouped into considerations of efficiency, competencies and ‘positional advantage’ 
(Stoelhorst, 1997). All these goals of collaboration are familiar from the literature, and will 
not be fully discussed here (e.g. Killing, 1983; Anderson 7 Gatignon, 1986; Porter & Fuller, 
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1986; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Jarillo, 1988; Ohmae, 1989; Lamming, 
1993; Faulkner, 1995). 
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
 I point out only a few items that may need to be highlighted. Economies of time entail 
the reduction of idle time of people, installations, or goods in stock, and set-up or switching 
times. Collaboration can help, for example, by reducing stocks in just-in-time delivery. One 
may want to swap products, e.g. in cross licensing, when the outcomes of R&D are 
unpredictable and turn out to yield products that do not fit in production or distribution (E4). 
An example is pharmaceutical products. For competencies, one may need to use 
complementary competencies of others that one could not oneself develop fast enough (C1). 
A new point concerns cognitive competence, with the need to prevent organisational myopia 
by supplementing perspectives from others, for extending ‘cognitive scope’, as indicated in 
the previous paragraph (C2). There is also an important argument of flexibility: one can more 
easily re-configure outside relations than build up and scrap activities within the firm (C3). 
Note that there are institutional differences here between different economies. In the US it is 
easier to hire and fire and to buy and sell parts of firms than it is in Europe. As a result, the 
need for outside collaboration is greater in (continental) Europe than in the US, resulting more 
in ‘networked economies’. Collaboration even between competitors may be desirable for 
developing and setting a joint standard in the market (P6), or for offering a joint portfolio of 
products (P4), especially in industrial markets. Large, global customers want a customised 
portfolio of goods/services at a range of different locations. We see this, for example, in ICT 
services. Of course a cartel -making price agreements or dividing the market between 
competitors (P7)- is forbidden by law, but firms may yet try it when they get the opportunity. 
 
Relational risk 
The goals represent the positive side of collaboration, but there is also a downside, in 
risks that it may entail. One is loss of capabilities and the other is relational risk, which has 
two forms: ‘hold-up’ and spillover risk. By outsourcing one may surrender the capability to 
assess the value of the offering of suppliers (Beije, 1998). Another problem is that one may 
drop a capability that later turns out to be crucial in order to utilise or replace elements of core 
competence. Teece (1986) proposed that the appropriation of returns on core competencies 
may require access to complementary assets. Even if those are not part of core competence, 
they may have to be integrated in the firm. One may therefore have to see such 
complementary assets as attached to core competence. 
In fact, some people argue that because of these problems outsourcing does not 
increase flexibility, as I argued above, but decreases it (Bettis, Bradley & Hamel 1992, Mol 
2001). However, there are ways to mitigate these problems. One is to make use of a 
benchmarking service, so that one can compare a supplier’s offering with best practice. A 
second is to maintain sufficient R&D in the outsourced activity to maintain ‘absorptive 
capacity’, i.e. the ability to judge developments in the field. This may also help to retain the 
option of re-entry later, to retain options for future core competencies, perhaps as a second 
mover, but still fast enough to be a serious player. This is reflected in empirical evidence that 
firms retain an R&D capability in activities that were outsourced (Granstrand, Pavel & Pavitt, 
1997). However, such R&D can perhaps be done in collaboration with others, in an R&D 
consortium. One may also try to retain the required openings in distribution channels, perhaps 
by means of alliances. In other words, outside collaboration may also be used to retain options 
for the utilisation or modification of core competencies. Here, the flexibility of outside 
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collaboration returns: one may use it to maintain more flexibility also in options for future 
core competence.  
As defined in TCE, the problem of hold-up results from dependence, in the form of 
switching costs: one incurs a loss if the relationship breaks. Part of that is the loss of relation-
specific investments, and the need for new ones in another relationship. As also argued by 
TCE, one may lose a hostage. There are also opportunity costs: the loss of the value that the 
current partner offers relative to the next best alternative. This depends on the availability of 
alternative partners, or the possibility of doing an activity oneself, and the extent that the 
partner offers something unique. In other words, it depends on the extent that a partner has a 
monopoly in his offering. The partner may achieve this by engaging in specific investments, 
to establish a unique offer. The ‘hold-up’ risk is that the partner may opportunistically use 
asymmetric dependence to demand a higher share of jointly produced added value, under the 
threat of exiting from the relationship.  
 One refinement is needed. Specificity of products does not necessarily entail 
specificity of the assets needed to produce them (Nooteboom, 1993). If production technology 
is flexible, one can produce specific, differentiated products with generic assets. This is 
important, because one of the effects of ICT is that a number of processes in design, 
production and marketing have become more flexible, thereby reducing the problem of 
specific investments. For example, in production one can change the program in a computer-
numerically-controlled (CNC) machine relatively easily, to craft different shapes and 
functions. Virtual specification and testing of prototypes yields much more flexibility and 
speed of development than real, physical prototyping and testing.  
Spillover yields another kind of appropriation problem. It entails that knowledge 
which constitutes competitive advantage reaches competitors and is used by them for 
imitation. The risk may be direct, in the partner becoming a competitor, or indirect, with 
knowledge spilling over to a competitor via a partner. In the past many firms have been overly 
concerned with spillover risk. First of all, one should realise that to get knowledge one must 
offer knowledge. The question is not how much knowledge one loses, but what the net 
balance is of giving and receiving knowledge. Second, when knowledge is tacit it spills over 
less easily than when it is documented. However, even then it can spill over, for example 
when the staff or the division in which the knowledge is embedded are poached, or when the 
staff involved have more allegiance to their profession than to the interests of the firm (Grey 
& Garsten, 2001), and professional vanity leads them to divulge too much in meetings with 
outside colleagues. Furthermore, the question is not whether information reaches a competitor 
but whether he will also be able to turn it into effective competition. For this he needs to 
understand it, and his absorptive capacity may not enable that. There may be ‘causal 
ambiguity’ (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Next, he will need to effectively implement it in his 
organisation. And finally, if by that time the knowledge has shifted, one does not care.  
 
Propositions 
H8: To some extent, more flexible technology has reduced the importance of specific 
investments, reducing hold-up risk. However, specific investments in developing 
mutual understanding and in the development of trust have become more pronounced. 
H9:  Spillover risk is often low, due to constraints in absorptive capacity of competitors, 
and rapid change of knowledge. 
H10: Outsourcing may yield loss of absorptive capacity and options for future core 
competencies. However, there are ways to maintain them also in outside relations. 
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ORGANISATIONAL FORMS 
 
Mergers/acquisitions or alliances? 
In collaboration, full integration entails a merger or acquisition (MA). Short of that, 
there is wide range of possible forms of collaboration ‘between market and hierarchy’. One 
intermediate form is a joint venture (JV), with a sharing of ownership and management 
among the parents. Other forms are: franchising, consortia, associations, Japanese ‘keiretsu’, 
‘industrial districts’, among others. These forms differ in centralisation of ownership and 
management, the number of participants, and the durability and content of collaboration. 
Consortia are often used for research, to spread costs and risks between multiple partners. 
Associations are typically used for joint advertising, lobbying, training, and certification.  
Franchising is typically used for distribution.     
 A central question is when and why firms should engage in full integration, in an MA, 
and when they should remain more or less separate, in an alliance, with an equity joint 
venture as an intermediate form. Table 2 summarises the argument for the alternatives of an 
MA and an alliance. 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Overall, the argument for integration, in an MA, is that it yields more control, in 
particular of hold-up and spillover risk. For hold-up, the argument comes from TCE. Within a 
firm, under the grasp of administrative fiat, one can demand more information for control and 
can impose more decisions than one could in respect of an independent partner. A similar 
argument applies to spillover risk: one can monitor and control better what happens to 
information.  
Overall, the argument for an alliance is that it allows partners to maintain more focus 
of core competence , more flexibility of configuration, and more variety of competence for 
the sake of innovation and learning, as discussed before. Also, as recognised in TCE, an 
independent firm that is responsible for its own survival will be more motivated to perform 
than an internal department that is assured of its custom. Another great advantage of an 
alliance is that it entails fewer problems of clashes between different cultures, structures and 
procedures, in management, decision making, remuneration, labour conditions, information 
and communication, which often turn out to be the biggest obstacles for a successful MA. Of 
course such clashes can also occur in alliances, but less integration still entails fewer problems 
of integration.   
The take-over of a young, dynamic, innovative firm may serve to rejuvenate an old 
firm (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). In a growing new firm, the entrepreneur often has to turn 
himself around to the role of an administrator, or hire one, to delegate work and institute 
formal structures and procedures for the coordination of more specialised activities in larger 
scale production. He may not be able or willing to do that, and it may be to the benefit of the 
firm when it is taken over by a firm with a better managerial capability. However, it may be 
more likely that the entrepreneurial dynamic of the small firm gets stifled in the bureaucracy 
of the acquirer, in which case it should stay separate.     
There is an argument of scale for both forms. In production, many economies of scale 
have been reduced, e.g. in computing. However, there is still economy of scale in, for 
instance, distribution channels, communication networks, network externalities, and brand 
name. For integration, the argument of scale is that one pools volume in activities in which 
one specialises. For outsourcing, the argument is that for activities that one does not specialise 
in, an outside, specialised producer can collect more volume, producing for multiple users. 
 
That may also offer more opportunities for professional development and career to staff that 
are specialised in that activity.  Note the argument from TCE that if assets are so dedicated 
that a supplier can produce only for the one user, the scale argument for outsourcing 
disappears.  
There is an argument of economies of scale or scope for integration only if they are 
inseparable (Williamson, 1975). It depends how ‘systemic’ rather than ‘stand-alone’ activities 
are (Langlois & Robertson, 1995). There are different forms of economy of scale. One of 
them, going back to Adam Smith, is greater efficiency by specialisation. Often, specialised 
activities can be outsourced. One form of economy of scope is that different activities share 
the same underlying fixed cost, for example of R&D, management and administration, 
communication network, or brand name. When one of the activities is dropped, the utilisation 
of fixed costs may drop. However, this is not necessarily so. It may be possible to share such 
overhead with others, as happens, for example, in ‘incubators’ for small firms, or 
collaboration in an R&D consortium.  
From the perspective of brand image there are arguments for both integration and 
separation. In an alliance there may be too great a risk that the image or quality of a brand 
allotted to partners will not be maintained sufficiently scrupulously. On the other hand, it may 
be better to maintain an independent, outside brand, to preserve its local identity. 
Finally, there are reasons of default. One is that one would like to take one form but it 
is not available, because a partner is only available for the other form, or because it is 
forbidden by competition authorities. In the airline business, for example, MA are problematic 
for reasons of national interest, and the fact that landing rights are nationally allocated. 
Another default is that one would like to take over only part of a larger firm, but it is not 
separately available for takeover, without the rest, in which one is not interested and which 
would dilute core competence. Another is that one cannot judge the value of a take-over 
candidate and needs some period of collaboration in an alliance to find out. Previously, value 
could more easily be judged by adding up values of material assets than now, when 
intangibles such as brand name, reputation, skills and knowledge are often more important.    
      Thus, the choice between MA and alliance is quite complex. If one wants a simpler, 
general rule of thumb, it is as follows: consider full integration, in an MA, only if the partner 
engages in the same core activities in the same markets. In all other cases, i.e. when activities 
or markets are different, the rule of thumb suggests an alliance. According to this rule, what 
one would expect, on the whole, is vertical disintegration and horizontal integration.   
The theoretical argument is as follows. In horizontal collaboration, with the same 
activities in the same markets, partners are direct competitors, and it is most difficult to 
control conflict without integration. The game is more likely to be zero-sum. The temptation 
to exploit dependence is greatest. There is a threat of direct rather than indirect spillover. In 
horizontal collaboration core competence is more similar, so that integration does not dilute it 
too much. Also, here the advantages of alliances are less: the diversity in knowledge is 
already minimal, with small cognitive distance, and thus there is less need to preserve it by 
staying apart. Finally, with the same products, technology and markets, differences in culture, 
structure, and procedures are likely to be minimal. Of course, they can still be substantial. An 
example where integration went wrong in spite of similarity of product, technology and 
markets was the failed merger between Dutch and German steel, many years ago. 
 The argument for this rule is not only theoretical. Bleeke & Ernst (1991) showed 
empirically that when this rule is applied, the success rate of both MA and alliances rises 
substantially. If for a given method of measurement the success rate is less than 50 % without 
the rule, success rises to 75 % with the rule, for both MA and alliances. However, I emphasize 
that the rule given above is only a rule of thumb, to which there are exceptions. For more 
detailed analysis one can use Table 2 and the logic set out previously. 
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Next to good reasons for MA, alliances and outsourcing, there are also reasons that are 
bad, in the sense that they are not in the interests of the firms involved. One such reason is the 
bandwagon effect: one engages in a practice because it is the fashion to do so. Another reason 
is a prisoner’s dilemma that applies especially to MA: if one does not take over one may be 
taken over, which may yield a loss of managerial position, so one tries to be the first to take 
over, even though it would be best for all to stay apart. Another reason is managerial ‘hubris’: 
managers want to make a mark and appear decisive or macho. This also applies especially to 
MA’s: those are quicker, more visible and dramatic than collaboration between independent 
firms. There is also the often illusory presumption that a take-over is easier than an alliance. 
Subsequently, however, the MA often fails due to problems of integration and has to be 
disentangled again. Even speed is a dubious argument. It may on the surface seem that an MA 
is in place faster than an alliance, for which one must negotiate longer and set up an elaborate 
system of ‘bilateral governance’. However, the speed of an MA is misleading: the decision 
may be made quickly, but the subsequent process of integration is often much slower and 
more problematic than assumed. 
 An equity joint venture is an intermediate case. It yields advantages of control without 
full integration of all activities of the parents. Thereby, it allows for more focus on core 
competencies and limits integration problems. It can separate off and protect a new, 
entrepreneurial activity from established bureaucracy. By separating activities off from the 
parents one can also better control spillover problems for existing partners. If an existing 
partner of one of the parents is suspicious that his knowledge may spill over to parts of the 
other parent that compete with him, in a joint venture that can be shielded off. The new 
venture may also offer new opportunities for financing.  
A well-known question concerning the governance of JV’s is whether ownership and 
control should be symmetric or concentrated in a clear majority shareholder (Killing, 1983; 
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). The argument 
for the latter is that it yields more decisiveness. The argument for the former is that a minority 
participant may suffer from a ‘Calimero syndrome’: being relatively small and dependent, he 
may not be motivated to do his best and may be overly suspicious of becoming the victim of 
opportunism, which blocks the building of trust. A solution may be to separate ownership and 
management, with a clear initiative in management for one side, whose actions are monitored 
by a balanced supervisory board. 
 
Networks 
Inter-firm relations go beyond dyads. There may be multiple participants and indirect 
linkages in networks. Those have implications for the value, risk and governance of relations. 
One may value a partner not for himself but for the access that he provides to others (see the 
‘positional advantage’ of relations included in Table 1). In an alliance, one may need to assess 
the risk that the partner may be taken over by a competitor, possibly in an indirect way, in 
which he takes over a majority shareholder of the partner (Lorange & Roos, 1992). Spillover 
risk can be indirect, through partners to competitors. If one already has many partners, adding 
a new one might raise spillover risk for existing partners. 
 Simmel (1950) argued that a fundamental shift occurs in going from dyadic to triadic 
relations (Krackhardt, 1999). In dyadic relations coalitions can occur, and no majority can 
outvote an individual. In a triad any member by himself has less bargaining power than in a 
dyad. The threat of exit carries less weight, since the two remaining partners would still have 
each other. In a triad, conflict is more readily solved. When any two players enter conflict, the 
third can act as a moderator or ‘go-between’. One stream of literature on networks suggests 
that players who span ‘structural holes’ can gain advantage (Burt, 1992). If individuals or 
communities A and B are connected only by C, then C can take advantage of his bridging 
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position by accessing resources that others cannot access, and by playing off A and B against 
each other. As a result, the third party is maximally powerful and minimally constrained in his 
actions. Krackhardt pointed out that this principle goes back to Simmel (1950). However, 
Krackhardt shows that Simmel also indicated that under some conditions the third party is 
maximally instead of minimally constrained. This occurs when he bridges two different 
cliques, with dense and strong internal ties, who entertain different values and norms, while 
both can observe his actions. The third party then has to satisfy the rules or norms of both 
cliques (the intersection of norm sets), and thereby he is constrained in his actions. The key 
factor that determines whether the bridging party is minimally or maximally constrained is the 
degree to which his actions are public, or at least known to both A and B. If not, then the 
situation described by Burt obtains, and he is minimally constrained. If his actions are public, 
he is maximally constrained. Membership of multiple cliques then yields a position of 
potential power, but also constrains the use of it. This often applies to managers or boundary 
spanners who bridge different departments or organizations. It can apply to the manager of a 
joint venture who still has allegiance to the parent who is his employer.  
One characteristic of network structure is density: the extent to which participants are 
linked to each other. With n participants, the maximum number of direct connections, where 
everyone is connected with everyone else, is n(n-1)/2. Thus, complexity rises with the square 
of the number of participants. With high density there is much redundancy of contacts, which 
can reduce efficiency and raise confusion. This is why we invented hierarchies. An alternative 
to avoid redundancy is a hub-and-spoke system, with the central hub collecting and 
distributing flows from all to all. High density increases risk of spillover, increases 
opportunities for coalitions, and enhances reputation mechanisms. It also reduces flexibility of 
configuration: there are more connections one has to get out of, and coalitions may prevent 
exit. A characteristic of network position is centrality: the extent to which there are 
participants with a large number of direct connections compared to others. One’s centrality in 
a network increases the dependence of partners, since one offers them more opportunities for 
indirect access to competence, knowledge, or markets. It can also raise spillover risks for 
partners. It limits flexibility of reconfiguring network relations. It subjects one to more 
conflicting norm sets, which may constrain actions (see the Simmelian argument discussed 
before). It subjects one to a more stringent reputation mechanism. Finally, dense network 
structure and centrality can yield reverberations, repercussions, and negative and positive 
feedbacks in the network, which can yield unforeseeable, chaotic results.       
 
Propositions 
H11: There are many contingencies to be taken into account in the choice between MA and 
alliance. There are good reasons for both. A simpler rule of thumb, with its exceptions, 
is to engage in MA only when partners have the same products in the same market. In 
all other cases the base case is an alliance. 
H12: One should look beyond dyads to network structure and position, to take into account 
redundancy, indirect spillover and take-over risks, reputation effects, and limits to 
flexibility.  
H13: Third parties bridging structural holes can be both minimally and maximally 
constrained, depending on whether their conduct is public or not.  
 
GOVERNANCE 
Instruments 
Instruments for governance, i.e. for controlling relational risk, derive from several 
theoretical perspectives. TCE yields the instruments of mutual dependence, sharing ownership 
and risk of specific assets, and hostages. Social exchange theory yields insight in the basis, 
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limits and process of trust. Social network theory yields insights in the role of network 
structure and position and third parties. The instruments are summarized in Table 3. 
--------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 The first two instruments in the table fall outside the scope of alliances. The first 
entails a cop-out: in view of relational risk hold-up is avoided by not engaging in dedicated 
investments, and spillover is avoided by not giving away any sensitive knowledge. The 
opportunity cost of this is that one may miss opportunities to achieve high added value in the 
production of specialties by investing in collaboration and learning with partners. The second 
instrument is integration in an MA, with the advantages and drawbacks discussed above. 
Below the line, we find the instruments for alliances, where one accepts the problems of 
dependence due to dedicated investment and possibilities of spillover, and seeks to control 
them by other means than full integration. 
One is to maintain multiple partners, in order not to become dependent on any one of 
them, and to demand exclusiveness from any partner, to prevent spillover. Exclusiveness 
entails that in the specific activity involved one forbids the partner to engage in relations with 
one’s competitors. The first problem with this is that the demand of exclusiveness forbids the 
partner what one allows oneself: partnerships with the partner’s competitors. By having those 
relations one increases the spillover risk for partners. As a result, none of them may be willing 
to give sensitive information, which degrades their value as sources of complementary 
competence and learning. Also, maintaining relations with alternative partners entails a 
multiplication of costs in dedicated investments and the governance needed to control the 
risks involved. Furthermore, the demand for exclusiveness blocks the variety of the partner’s 
sources of learning, which reduces his value as a partner in learning, at a cognitive distance 
that is maintained by his outside contacts. Hence one should consider whether spillover is 
really a significant risk, as discussed before. If it is not, all parties can gain from maintaining 
multiple partners, not so much for maintaining bargaining position as for maintaining variety 
of sources of learning and flexibility of configurations.   
A second instrument is a contract, in an attempt to close off ‘opportunities for 
opportunism’ (Nooteboom, 1996). The problem with this instrument is fourfold. It can be 
expensive to set up. It can be ineffective for lack of possibilities to monitor compliance, due 
to asymmetric information. It can be impossible because of uncertainty concerning future 
contingencies that affect contract execution. Finally, detailed contracts for the purpose of 
closing off opportunities for opportunism express distrust, which can raise reciprocal 
suspicion and distrust, with the risk of ending up in a vicious circle of regulation and distrust 
that limits the scope for exploration of novelty and obstructs the build-up of trust as an 
alternative approach to governance. 
Another approach is to aim at the self-interest of the partner and limit incentives to 
utilise any opportunities for opportunism left by incomplete contracts. These instruments have 
been mostly developed in TCE. Self-interest may arise from mutual dependence, in several 
ways. One is that the partner participates more or less equally in the ownership and hence the 
risk of dedicated assets. A second is that one uses one’s own dedicated investments to build 
and offer a unique, valuable competence to the partner. Thus, the effect of dedicated 
investments can go in different directions: it makes one dependent due to switching costs, but 
it can also make the partner dependent by offering him high and unique value. This 
instrument can yield an upward spiral of value, where partners engage in a competition to be 
of unique value for each other. Dependence also arises from a hostage, as also suggested by 
TCE. One form of hostage is a minority participation, where one can sell one’s shares to 
someone who is eager to take over the partner. A more prevalent form is sensitive 
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information. Here, the notion of hostage connects with the notion of spillover. One may 
threaten to pass on sensitive knowledge to a partner’s competitor. Reputation also is a matter 
of self-interest: one behaves well in order not to sacrifice potentially profitable relations with 
others in the future (Weigelt & Camerer 1988).  
The limitation of instruments aimed at self-interest is that they are not based on 
intrinsic motivation, and require monitoring, which may be difficult. Furthermore, balance of 
mutual dependence is sensitive to technological change and to the entry of new players that 
might offer more attractive partnerships. Hostages may die or may not be returned in spite of 
compliance to the agreement. Reputation mechanisms may not be in place, or may work 
imperfectly (Hill, 1990; Lazaric & Lorenz, 1998). They require that a defector cannot escape 
and dodge a breakdown of reputation, perhaps because he is selling the business or switching 
to another industry or another country. It requires that complaints of bad behavior be checked 
for their truth and communicated to potential future partners of the culprit. 
 
Trust 
Trust is a slippery and complex notion, which cannot be dealt with completely in this 
paper (for a full treatment, see Nooteboom, 2002). A common definition of trust is that it 
entails an acceptance of relational risk, in the expectation that no harm will be done. Most 
people would agree that one couldn’t speak of ‘real’ trust when the expectation is based on 
coercion by hierarchy, contract or incentives of self-interest. Real trust is then defined as the 
expectation that no harm will be done, even though the partner has both the opportunity and 
the incentive to defect (Bradach & Eccles, 1984; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Nooteboom, 
1996). That can be based on ‘universalistic’ ethics, values and norms of reciprocity or 
obligation that prevail in a culture, on characteristics such as membership of a family or 
association, in ‘characteristics based trust’ (Zucker, 1986), or on ‘particularistic’ bonding in a 
specific relationship, on the basis of empathy or mutual identification, friendship or 
habitualisation (McAllister 1995, Gulati, 1995, Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Nooteboom, 
Noorderhaven & Berger 1997). 
Another important point is that trustworthiness will almost always have its limits. 
Williamson (1993) was surely correct to say that blind, unconditional trust is generally 
unwise. Even the sincerest wish to be loyal may break down under temptation or pressures. 
Even of one’s best friend one cannot really expect that he will remain loyal even under the 
direst pressures of survival, such as torture, and it would be unethical to demand that. Thus, 
trust is subject to tolerance levels: one trusts within limits of observed conditions and actions. 
Within those limits, one does not continually question competencies and loyalties, and one is 
not continually on the lookout for opportunities for opportunism. When the limits are 
exceeded, one starts to be aware of potential opportunism, and to consider exit. In voice, such 
concerns are communicated, in an effort to jointly resolve them. Nevertheless, voice is 
constrained by the possibility of exit, as Hirschman recognised. However, though this may 
seem paradoxical, one can exit also with the use of voice. I will return to this later.  
If trust is not in place prior to collaboration, it has to be built up in the relation, in 
‘process based trust’. One cannot buy and install trust, but one can create the conditions for it 
to develop, in ‘trust-sensitive management’ (Sydow, 2000: 54). As a relationship develops, 
partners begin to know each other better, and can better assess the extent and limits of 
trustworthiness (‘knowledge based trust’). Convergence of cognitive frameworks may arise, 
which can lead to mutual identification (‘identification based trust’) (McAllister 1995, 
Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Partners understand and can identify with each other's goals, 
weaknesses and mistakes, and are able to engage in the give and take of voice. This does not 
entail that they always agree. There may be sharp disagreements, but those are combined with 
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a willingness to express and discuss them more or less openly, in ‘voice’, offering mutual 
benefit of the doubt. As a result, conflicts may deepen trust rather than breaking it. 
Lewicki and Bunker claimed that when trust is not in place at the beginning, one has 
to start with control, and later switch to trust based on the growth of identification. However, 
as noted before, control in the form of detailed contracts to close off opportunities for 
opportunism can yield an escalation of mutual distrust that precludes the building of trust. 
Alternatively, one could start a relation ship with small steps of low-level mutual dependence, 
and increase commitment as trust in competence and commitment grows (Shapiro, 1987). 
One limitation of this is that one may not have the time to build trust in this way. 
Mutual openness is needed to pool complementary assets and competencies. It is also 
essential to the building of trust (Zand, 1972). A rich flow of information is needed for the 
‘let's work things out’ approach of the voice strategy (Maguire, Philips & Hardy, 2001). 
Things may go wrong in a relation because of outside accidents, mistakes, lack of competence 
or because of opportunism, but in practice they are difficult to identify because an opportunist 
will claim mishaps or mistakes as the cause of disappointing results. That is why openness also 
about one’s mistakes is crucial, to prevent their being interpreted as opportunism. 
In buyer-supplier relationships, for example, one needs to achieve the openness that is 
needed in co-makership and early supplier involvement, and to build and maintain trust. 
However, it is difficult to achieve openness when the focus is on bargaining for price, to 
secure sufficient profit. One may need to hide information on costs and competence to 
maintain bargaining position. Therefore, partners must grant each other profit, in ‘price-minus 
costing’: production cost is set at price minus a profit margin for the supplier. One argument 
for this is that there is lack of continuity in a partner who may go broke for lack of profit. 
Another is to ‘earn’ the partner’s openness. What may be lost in price may be more than 
regained in quality and speed. This is particularly so when contracts cannot be closed, and a 
partner regains profit in unforeseen and uncontracted work. An example of this is the building 
industry. Bargaining focuses on minimum price, which yields closure of information, which 
inhibits opportunities to collaborate for optimal quality, speed, and fit in time, place and 
technical interfaces. Insiders claim that up to 25% of final cost is due to such mismatches. 
And then the builder recoups profit in unforeseen work, so that minimum price is not actually 
achieved.  
This open-book contracting and price-minus costing is one of the lessons the West has 
learned from the Japanese, particularly in the car industry (Helper, 1990; Cusumano & 
Fujimoto, 1991; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993; Lamming, 1993; Kamath & Liker, 1994; Dyer, 1996; 
De Jong & Nooteboom, 2001). However, Western buyers did not copy the all too durable and 
exclusive buyer-supplier relations that were customary in the Japanese vertical structures of 
‘keiretsu’. As discussed before, some durability is needed to recoup dedicated investments, 
and exclusiveness may be needed to control spillover, but too durable and exclusive relations 
yield rigidities. The West adapted the system, with relations that are closer to optimal 
duration, and without unnecessary exclusiveness, in view of limited risks of spillover.  Now 
the Japanese appear to be learning from that and are beginning to open up or break down their 
keiretsu (de Jong & Nooteboom, 2001).    
If it is normal and desirable that relationships should end, before they create rigidities, 
the question arises how to do that. That may be at least as important as beginning a relationship, 
and is probably more difficult. If one wants to end a relation because a more attractive option 
has emerged, should one announce this intention at an early stage, or should one prepare one’s 
exit in secret, and drop the bomb on the partner at the last moment? In other words should one 
go for an adversarial or a collaborative ‘voice’ mode of exit (Nooteboom, 1999)?  With the 
second, one offers the partner a timely way out with least damage: he stops making specific 
investments that would maintain his switching cost, retrieves hostages, and one helps him to 
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find a new partner, in order to minimise disruption. A harsh exit approach to end a relationship 
may yield great trouble of emotional response, acrimony, resistance, and damage to 
reputation. A voice approach to exit does give the partner time to better obstruct one’s 
departure. Nevertheless, collaborative divorce is viable if the partner can be expected to cut his 
losses and welcome the help to get out with minimal damage.  
 
Go-betweens 
 One can use the services of third parties, ‘guardians of trust’ (Shapiro, 1987), 
‘Intermediate communities’ (Fukuyama, 1995), or ‘go-betweens’ (Nooteboom, 1999). One 
role, recognized in TCE, is that of arbitration or mediation in ‘trilateral governance’. A second 
is to assess the value of information before it is traded, to solve the ‘revelation problem: if one 
wants to sell information, the partner will want to assess its value by looking into it, but then 
he already has the information and might no longer pay for it. This problem can be solved in 
several ways, and one of them is to let a go-between assess the value of the information for 
the potential buyer. A third role is to create mutual understanding, helping to cross cognitive 
distance. A fourth role is to monitor information flow as a guard against spillover. The reason 
for this role is that if partner A does the monitoring himself, in the firm of partner B, then this 
look into B’s firm may increase the spillover from B to A. A fifth role is to act as a guardian of 
hostages. Without that, there may be a danger that the hostage keeper does not return the 
hostage even if the partner sticks to the agreement. The third party has an interest in maintaining 
symmetric trust and acceptance by both protagonists. 
 A sixth, and perhaps most crucial role, is to act as an intermediary in the building of 
trust. Trust relations are often entered with partners who are trusted partners of someone you 
trust  (Sydow, 2000). If X trusts Y and Y trusts Z, then X may rationally give trust in Z a 
chance. X needs to feel that Y is able to judge well and has no intention to lie about his 
judgment. This can speed up the building of trust between strangers, which might otherwise 
take too long. This is particularly important in view of the dynamics of the build-up and 
breakdown of trust. I noted above that new relationships might have to start small, with low 
stakes that are raised as trust builds up. This may be needed especially when contracts are not 
feasible or desirable. As indicated, the disadvantage of such a procedure is its slowness. A go-
between may provide help for a more speedy development. Intermediation in the first small 
and ginger steps of cooperation, to ensure that they are successful, can be very important in 
the building of a trust relation. The intermediary can perform valuable services in protecting 
trust when it is still fragile: to eliminate misunderstanding and allay suspicions when errors or 
mishaps are mistaken as signals of opportunism. A seventh role, related to the sixth, is to help 
in the timely and least destructive disentanglement of relations. To eliminate 
misunderstanding, and to prevent acrimonious and mutually damaging battles of divorce, a 
go-between can offer valuable services, to help in what I called ‘a voice type of exit’. An 
eighth role is to support a reputation mechanism. As indicated earlier, for a reputation 
mechanism to work, infringement of agreements must be observable, its report must be 
credible, and it must reach potential future partners of the culprit. The go-between can help in 
all respects. 
 
Contingencies 
One will generally select some combination of mutually compatible and supporting 
instruments from the toolbox of governance, and the use of a single instrument will be rare. 
There is no single and universal best recipe. The choice and effectiveness of instruments 
depend on conditions: the goals of collaboration, characteristics of the participants, 
technology, markets and the institutional environment. For example, there is no sense in 
contracts when the appropriate institutions of laws are not in place, the police or judiciary is 
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corrupt, and when compliance cannot be monitored. When technology is flexible, so that one 
can produce a range of different specific products with one set-up, the specificity of 
investments and hence the problem of hold-up is limited. Possibilities of spillover are 
constrained when knowledge is tacit, and do not matter when technology changes fast. 
Reputation mechanisms don’t work when there are ample exit opportunities for defectors. 
Trust is difficult in a distrustful environment, where cheating rather than loyalty is the norm.  
 Innovation has its special conditions. Exchange of knowledge is crucial, with 
corresponding risks of spillover. Especially in innovation the competencies and intentions of 
strangers are difficult to judge. Relevant reputation has not yet been built up. Uncertainty is 
large, limiting the possibility of specifying the contingencies of a contract. Specific invest-
ments are needed to set op mutual understanding. There is significant hold-up risk. Detailed 
contracts would limit the variety and scope for unpredictable actions and initiatives that 
innovation requires. With these problems in contracts, trust is most needed to limit relational 
risk. An additional problem with contracts is that they may obstruct the building of trust. This 
does not mean that there are no contracts, but that they cannot be too detailed with the 
purpose of controlling hold-up risk. A productive combination of instruments is mutual 
dependence complemented by trust on the basis of an emerging experience in competent and 
loyal collaboration. Trust is needed besides mutual dependence, because the latter is sensitive 
to changing conditions. Trust is more difficult under asymmetric dependence because the 
more dependent side may be overly suspicious (Klein Woolthuis, 1999). In all this, go-
betweens can help, with the roles specified before. Without them the building of trust may be 
too slow.  
 In the literature, contracts and trust are primarily seen as substitutes. Less trust 
requires more contracts, and detailed contracts can obstruct the building of trust. However, 
this view is too simplistic. Trust and control can also be complements (Das & Teng 1998 
2001, Klein Woolthuis 1999). There may be a need for an extensive contract, not so much to 
foreclose opportunities for opportunism, but to serve as a record of agreements in a situation 
where coordination is technically complex. A simple contract may provide the basis for 
building trust. One may need to build up trust before engaging in the costs and risks of setting 
up a contract. Signing a contract me be a ritual of agreement and a symbol of trust.  
 Finally, perhaps the most important point is that relationships should be seen as 
processes rather than entities that are instituted and left to themselves. Conditions may 
change. A frequent problem is that a relationship starts with a balance of dependence, but in 
time the attractiveness of one of the partners slips, due to slower learning, appropriation of his 
knowledge by the other, institutional, technological or commercial change. A classic example 
is the alliance between an American company that supplies design or technology, and a 
Japanese company that supplies access to the Japanese market. After a while, the Japanese 
company has copied the technology and competencies, but is itself still needed for market 
access. This often leads to a disentangling of the alliance or one side buying out the other. 
Alliances may from the start have been designed to have limited duration. It may be used to 
have a joint standard accepted in the market, or as an exploratory stage for an MA, to assess 
value and the viability of integrating cultures. 
  One needs to select instruments with a view to needs and opportunities for adapting or 
replacing them in the future. One example is not to go for detailed contracts to foreclose 
opportunities for opportunism, in order to maintain an opening for the building of trust. An 
aggressive stance of exit is often difficult to credibly turn around in a collaborative stance of 
voice. In the process of setting up collaboration a mistake often is that it starts with harsh 
negotiation between the leaders. Then it is thrown into the lap of an implementation manager, 
who is saddled with an atmosphere of distrust and acrimony that jeopardizes the relationship 
before it has properly started. A solution is to include the implementation manager in the 
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negotiation process, to charge negotiators also with implementation, or to make use of a 
skilled go-between.  If earlier in the relation one took a voice approach, then an adversarial 
approach to ending the relation is likely to create more upheaval than if one took an exit 
stance to the relation from the beginning.    
 
Propositions 
H14: There is no universal best tool for governance. There is a toolbox from which one 
should judiciously select a mix that fits with a range of contingencies. 
H15: Especially in innovation, formal control or deterrence has its limits, and mutual 
dependence combined with trust is to be preferred. 
H16: Trust is viable, but is subject to limits. 
H17: Trust and control are both complements and substitutes. 
H18: Go-betweens can help to solve a range of problems in governance.  
H19: Voice is constrained by exit, but there are voice forms of ending a relationship. 
H20: Relationships are dynamic, and instruments of governance should be chosen also with 
a view to later adjustment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article offers a coherent, balanced set of theoretical perspectives, goals, forms of 
collaboration and instruments for its governance. They form a toolbox from which one can 
select according to circumstances. Competence and governance views are integrated. 
Transaction Cost Economics suffers from fundamental shortcomings, but still retains elements 
that are useful for governance. Outsourcing all that does not belong to core competence can 
be problematic. One needs to consider loss of options on future core competencies and 
relational risk. However, some of these problems can also be solved in alliances. Trust is 
viable, but has its limits. Voice is limited by exit, but there are voice forms of ending a 
relationship. Ending relationships well is as important as setting them up.  
The analysis yield tools for practice: for deciding what to do oneself and what to do 
outside, whether to go for a merger/acquisition or alliance, what instruments to use for 
governance, and under what conditions.  Much of the logic set out in this paper can also be 
applied to relations within firms, but that is not the focus of this paper.  
There is much more research to be done on the process side of trust and collaboration. 
In further research, I suggest that there is much to be gotten out of the use of social 
psychology. This could yield more insight in how people perceive and interpret actions of 
others, and infer or attribute motives and capabilities to partners.
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Table 1: goals of collaboration 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Efficiency 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
E1 avoid overcapacity 
E2 economy of scale, scope or time 
E3 spread risk 
E4 combine or swap products 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Competencies 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
C1 complementary competencies 
C2 variety of learning 
C2 flexibility of configuration 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Positioning 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
P1 satisfy demands from local government on local content, repatriation of profits, use of 
expatriates  
P2 fast access to new markets of products and inputs 
P3 adjustment of products, technology or inputs to local markets and conditions 
P4 the offer of a joint product package  
P5 attack a competitor in his home market 
P6 establish a standard in the market 
P7 a cartel 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 2: reasons for an MA vs. an alliance 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   MA (integration)  Alliance (keeping distance)  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Efficiency inseparable economy of scale economy of scale in non-core 
    in core activities    activities 
  inseparable economy of scope motivating force of independence 
    lower costs and risks of integration 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Competence maintain appropriability, maintain focus on core competence 
   options for future competence 
  spillover control  maintain diversity, cognitive distance 
  rejuvenation   maintain entrepreneurial drive  
  provide management for 
    a growing firm 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Positional control hold-up risk  maintain flexibility    
advantage control quality brand name maintain local identity/brand of partner 
  protect other partners from  
   spillover 
  ensure against take-over    
keep out competition  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
By default partner only available in MA partner only available in alliance 
  difficulty of evaluating a interest only in part of a partner   
    take-over candidate 
  collusion forbidden by   MA forbidden by 
    competition authorities   competition authorities  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Rule of thumb in case of same core   in case of complementary competencies 
  competencies and same  and markets 
  markets  
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Table 3: instruments of governance, and their drawbacks 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrument   Drawback 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Risk avoidance:  lower added value, with lesser product differentiation (in case  
no specific investments,  of dedicated technology), 
no knowledge transfer  no learning, 
 
Integration:   less flexibity, variety, motivation,  
MA     and problems of integration (see Table 2)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Number of partners: 
maintain alternatives  mutiple set-up costs, spillover risk for partners 
demand exclusiveness  limitation of variety and learning 
 
Contracts:   problematic under uncertainty, can be expensive, 
    straight-jacket in innovation, can generate distrust 
 
Self-interest:   opportunistic: requires monitoring and is sensitive to 
mutual dependence  change of capabilities, conditions, and entry 
hostages,   of new players 
reputation 
 
Trust:    needs building up if not already present 
has limits, how reliable? Relation between individual and 
organisation 
 
Go-betweens:   may not be available, how reliable? 
 
Network position:  needs time to build, side effects 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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